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COMING DOWN THE PIPELINE: FIRST
AMENDMENT CHALLENGES TO STATELEVEL “CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE”
TRESPASS LAWS
JENNA RUDDOCK*
Since late 2016, state legislatures across the country have been inundated by
a wave of anti-protest bills. In states with significant oil and gas development,
new “critical infrastructure” trespass laws have raised the stakes for those who
protest pipeline construction, whether on public or private land. In some states,
these laws make trespassing near pipelines a felony; in other states,
organizations who aid pipeline protestors face potentially devastating financial
liability. This Article explores the critical First Amendment concerns raised by
critical infrastructure trespass laws, as well as their implications for the future
of American protest. These laws implicate an uncertain but undeniably vast
amount of both public and private lands where protected expression can and
should be able to occur. Provisions targeting “conspirator” groups additionally
violate individuals’ and organizations’ First Amendment rights to free speech
and free association. These statutes’ vagueness and their outsized penalties risk
criminalizing protected speech and thus have an unconstitutional chilling effect
on the legitimate exercise of free speech and free association by individuals and
groups organizing to protest fossil fuel infrastructure development.

* Senior Staff Member, American University Law Review, Volume 69; J.D. Candidate,
May 2020, American University Washington College of Law. This Comment would never have
been finished without support from my family, especially my husband, Jorge Franzini, and
my parents, Susan and Ted. I am also endlessly grateful for the Law Review staff’s hard
work, as well as for the encouragement and support of Professors Amanda Leiter and
Robert Tsai. This Comment is dedicated to environmental defenders on the front lines in
the United States and around the world.
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INTRODUCTION
In late summer 2018, two sets of trespassing charges were filed in
southern Louisiana in connection with the Bayou Bridge pipeline, a
project stretching across sections of Louisiana’s ecologically sensitive
(and crawfish-rich) Atchafalaya Basin. The first charges were filed
against pipeline protesters, who had been arrested after being detained
by private security for the company funding the pipeline, Energy
Transfer Partners.1 The rest of the charges were filed against the
pipeline company itself, which had moved construction crews onto
private property against the express wishes of landowners, proceeding
to cut down trees and tear up land without a clear legal right to be there.2
Just two weeks earlier, Louisiana’s legislature passed a new law that
heightened protections for “critical infrastructure”—a category
lawmakers deliberately expanded beyond its definition at the time (which
included sites such as water treatment facilities and power stations) to
include pipeline construction sites and any land containing equipment
or materials being used to construct a pipeline.3 Similar critical
infrastructure trespass bills have been cropping up in state legislatures
around the country since early 2017,4 following the widely covered

1. See Karen Savage, Louisiana Law Enforcement Officers Are Moonlighting for a
Controversial Pipeline Company, APPEAL (Aug. 28, 2018), https://theappeal.org/
louisiana-police-arrest-bayou-bridge-pipeline-protesters
[https://perma.cc/RLQ8F78J]; see also Atchafalaya Basin, ATCHAFALAYA NAT’L HERITAGE AREA,
http://www.atchafalaya.org/atchafalaya-basin [https://perma.cc /4T9W-CG3V]
(noting that the Atchafalaya Basin’s “estimated average annual commercial harvest” of
crawfish totals nearly twenty-two million pounds).
2. See Julie Dermansky, Despite Lingering Land Dispute, Louisiana’s Bayou Bridge
Pipeline Is Nearly Complete, DESMOGBLOG (Oct. 11, 2018), https://www.
desmogblog.com/2018/10/11/atchafalaya-basin-land-dispute-louisiana-bayoubridge-pipeline [https://perma.cc/F9KB-F6CQ]; Steve Hardy, Bayou Bridge Pipeline
Builders Must Pay $450 for Trespassing; Judge OKs Land Seizure, ADVOC. (Dec. 6, 2018),
https://www.theadvocate.com/baton_rouge/news/environment/article_7cd9cd64f713-11e8-ba69-e3d91d6d0aaa.html [https://perma.cc/QKK5-3KRR].
3. H.B. 727, 2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (La. 2018).
4. See Alleen Brown, Ohio and Iowa Are the Latest of Eight States to Consider Anti-Protest
Bills Aimed at Pipeline Opponents, INTERCEPT (Feb. 2, 2018), https://theintercept.com/
2018/02/02/ohio-iowa-pipeline-protest-critical-infrastructure-bills [https://perma.cc/Z4
BE-HQLT] (describing the development of critical infrastructure bills in states such as
Ohio and Iowa); see also Stacy M. Brown, Bill Raising Infrastructure Trespassing Penalty Called
‘Out of Line’, PHILA. TRIB. (Oct. 12, 2018), https://www.phillytrib.com/news/
state_and_region/bill-raising-infrastructure-trespassing-penalty-called-out-ofline/article_f6bf6eab-1153-5ad0-9bbd-7f0cf0ce8537.html [https://perma.cc/4A2S-E6VR]
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clashes between demonstrators and law enforcement in Cannon Ball,
North Dakota, along the construction route of the Dakota Access
pipeline.5 The Louisiana state legislature successfully passed its critical
infrastructure trespass law in 2018, approximately one year after
Oklahoma passed the first.6 At least a half dozen other states have drafted
similar bills, and several have put these bills to a vote.7
Because of Louisiana’s new law, the protesters arrested in early
September faced potential felony charges for the alleged crime of
trespassing on a pipeline easement—land upon which, mere weeks
earlier, trespassers would have faced at most a misdemeanor charge.8
Meanwhile, for Energy Transfer Partners’ acts of trespass, a Louisiana
judge granted the company rights to the land and required them to pay
just $150 to each landowner whose property construction crews
occupied and damaged.9
This Comment will argue that critical infrastructure trespass laws are
unconstitutionally vague and overbroad, implicating an uncertain but
undeniably vast amount of both public and private lands where protected
expression can and should be able to occur. The provisions in these laws
targeting “conspirator” groups additionally violate individuals’ and

(stating that Pennsylvania’s state legislature was also considering a critical
infrastructure trespass bill).
5. See Julia Carrie Wong & Sam Levin, Standing Rock Protesters Hold out Against
Extraordinary
Police
Violence,
GUARDIAN
(Nov.
29,
2016,
3:26
PM),
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/nov/29/standing-rock-protest-northdakota-shutdown-evacuation
[https://perma.cc/UQY4-EU64]
(“Police
have
acknowledged using sponge rounds, bean bag rounds, stinger rounds, teargas grenades,
pepper spray, Mace, Tasers and a sound weapon . . . . More than two dozen people
were hospitalized and 300 injured . . . .”).
6. See New Lawsuit Challenges Anti-Protest Trespass Law: Pipeline Protesters, Journalists,
and Landowners Sue Over Louisiana Law, CTR. FOR CONST. RTS (May 22, 2019),
https://ccrjustice.org/home/press-center/press-releases/new-lawsuit-challengesanti-protest-trespass-law [https://perma.cc/T7MP-YAJA].
7. See Alleen Brown, supra note 4 (naming Ohio and Iowa as two states
considering critical infrastructure trespass bills and listing North Dakota, South
Dakota, and Oklahoma as already passing such bills); see also Naveena Sadasivan, After
Standing Rock, Protesting Pipelines Can Get You a Decade in Prison and $100K in Fines, GRIST
(May 14, 2019), https://grist.org/article/after-standing-rock-protesting-pipelines-can-getyou-a-decade-in-prison-and-100k-in-fines [https://perma.cc/WAF8-T3QG] (adding Texas,
Minnesota, Kentucky, and Illinois as states in the process of considering similar legislation).
8. See Travis Lux, Tougher Laws on Pipeline Protests Face Test in Louisiana, NPR (Sept.
19, 2018), https://www.npr.org/2018/09/19/648029225/tougher-laws-on-pipelineprotests-face-test-in-louisiana [https://perma.cc/5VZL-KMU4].
9. See Hardy, supra note 2.
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organizations’ First Amendment rights to free speech and free
association. These statutes’ vagueness and their outsized penalties risk
criminalizing protected speech and thus have an unconstitutional chilling
effect on the legitimate exercise of free speech and free association by
individuals and groups organizing to protest fossil fuel infrastructure
development. Part I will discuss the events that inspired the wave of antiprotest legislation that included the first critical infrastructure trespass
bills, the central components of these bills, and key First Amendment
issues that these laws raise. Part II will analyze the strongest potential
First Amendment challenges to critical infrastructure trespass laws and
argue that critical infrastructure trespass bills are unconstitutionally
overbroad and vague. Finally, the Conclusion explores whether
existing First Amendment jurisprudence goes far enough in protecting
free speech rights in the context of civil disobedience, or whether
courts’ reluctance to scrutinize facially neutral, conduct-oriented laws
under the First Amendment creates opportunities for legislative abuse.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Oil and Water: State Lawmakers’ Escalating Hostility Towards Protesters
During and After Standing Rock
As the saying goes, there is no putting toothpaste back in the tube.
The same is true for oil and oil pipelines. When oil spills, no cleanup
effort can return the surrounding landscape to its prior condition.10
While affected wildlife populations may eventually recover, individual
birds and mammals rarely do; studies have demonstrated that “in
general, the post-treatment survival rate of oil-soaked birds is less than
one percent.”11 Like birds, mammals attempt to clean themselves of the
oil, ultimately dying of organ failure.12 Cleaning oil-soaked vegetation
often requires cutting or burning plants that cannot be protected ahead

10. Andrew Nikiforuk, Why We Pretend to Clean Up Oil Spills, SMITHSONIAN.COM (July
12,
2016),
https://www.smithsonianmag.com/science-nature/oil-spill-cleanupillusion [https://perma.cc/7CKR-4EL3] (“In an oil-based society, the cleanup
delusion is also irresistible. Just as it is difficult for us to acknowledge the limits of
medical intervention, society struggles to acknowledge the limits of technologies or
the consequences of energy habits. And that’s where the state of marine oil spill
response sits today: it creates little more than an illusion of a cleanup. Scientists—
outside the oil industry—call it ‘prime-time theater’ or ‘response theater.’”).
11. Id.
12. Id.

670

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69:665

of time.13 Groundwater is equally vulnerable, and while water supplies
can sometimes be restored to useable quality after an oil spill,
groundwater contamination in particular “is not always amenable to
total clean up.”14 Oil-contaminated water can cause serious harm to the
health of anyone who relies on that water source, from liver and kidney
damage to elevated risk for certain blood conditions ranging from
high blood pressure to leukemia.15 The United States has experienced
“more than 1,500 spills from crude oil pipelines” in the last decade.16
In late 2014, Texas-based Energy Transfer Partners began applying
for permits to build a 1172-mile crude oil pipeline stretching from
North Dakota’s booming Bakken oil fields to southern Illinois.17 The
pipeline’s proposed route required tunneling under the Missouri
River, the longest river in the United States, a half-mile upstream from
the Standing Rock Sioux Reservation and surrounding lands near
Cannon Ball, North Dakota.18 In addition to the Standing Rock Sioux
Tribe, roughly seventeen million people downstream of the reservation
rely on the Missouri River for water.19 Other proposed pipeline routes,
including one that would have placed the pipeline’s Missouri River
crossing just north of North Dakota’s capital, Bismarck, were rejected—
partly due to concerns over risks to the city’s water supply.20
Over the next two years, opposition to the pipeline mounted, particularly
on the Standing Rock reservation.21 Even other federal agencies began to
13. Oil Spills in Rivers, NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN. OFF. OF RESPONSE &
RESTORATION,
https://response.restoration.noaa.gov/oil-and-chemical-spills/oilspills/resources/oil-spills-rivers.html [https://perma.cc/JQZ8-KPLR].
14. Ejikeme Ugwoha & Benedict Emeka Omenogor, Effect of Oil Spillage on
Groundwater Quality, 3 J. ENVTL. STUD. 1, 1 (2017), http://www.avensonline.org/wpcontent/uploads/JES-2471-4879-03-0019.pdf [https://perma.cc/74YS-VEGZ].
15. Id.
16. Ryan W. Miller, How the Dakota Access Pipeline Battle Unfolded, USA TODAY (Dec.
2, 2016), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2016/12/02/timelinedakota-access-pipeline-and-protests/94800796 [https://perma.cc/P98Z-TMYC].
17. Id.
18. Oil, Water, and Steel, EARTHJUSTICE, https://earthjustice.org/features/oil-waterand-steel-the-dakota-access-pipeline [https://perma.cc/VS4U-WR4G].
19. Id.
20. U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT: DAKOTA ACCESS
PIPELINE PROJECT CROSSINGS OF FLOWAGE EASEMENTS AND FEDERAL LANDS 8 (2016).
21. See Jack Healy, North Dakota Oil Pipeline Battle: Who’s Fighting and Why, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 26, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/02/us/north-dakota-oilpipeline-battle-whos-fighting-and-why.html (examining the status of the North Dakota oil
pipeline battle, including the increase in the numbers of individuals participating in the
protests and the resulting increase in clashes between protesters and law enforcement).
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voice concerns in early 2016, after the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
published a draft Environmental Assessment regarding the pipeline’s
Missouri River crossing.22 In March of that year, for example, the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) sent a letter to the Army Corps
calling for a revised draft Environmental Assessment and a second public
comment period in light of the route’s proximity to the Standing Rock
reservation and other drinking water supplies.23 The U.S. Department of
the Interior and the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation sent similar
letters citing worries that the Corps “did not adequately justify or otherwise
support its conclusion that there would be no significant impacts upon
the surrounding environment and community.”24
Over that summer, members of the Standing Rock community,
other Native tribes, and environmental groups from across the country
began arriving in Cannon Ball, where two makeshift camps had been
set up near the pipeline’s contested river crossing site.25 The main
camp, Sacred Stone Camp, sat on land located within the boundaries

22. News Releases, Corps Grants Easement to Dakota Access, LLC, OMAHA DIST., U.S.
ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS (Feb. 8, 2017), https://www.nwo.usace.army.mil/Media/NewsReleases/Article/1077134/corps-grants-easement-to-dakota-access-llc
[https://perma.cc/FD9U-54KL].
23. Letter from Philip S. Strobel, Dir., NEPA Compliance & Review Program, United
States Envtl. Protection Agency Region 8, to U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, Omaha Dist., (Mar.
11, 2016) https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/3036068-Dakota-Access-2ndDEA-Cmts-3-11-16-002.html [https://perma.cc/8VXP-YDBG] (“[W]e recommend that
the applicant’s spill planning and emergency response efforts cover the entire length of
the pipeline as the proposed pipeline crosses many creeks and rivers that could quickly
convey a spill into the Missouri River or other water resources.”).
24. Letter from Lawrence S. Roberts, Acting Assistant Sec’y Indian Affairs, U.S.
Dep’t of the Interior, to Brent Cossette, U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, Omaha Dist. (Mar.
29, 2016), http://indigenousrising.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/DOI-SignedStanding-Rock-Corps-Letter.pdf [https://perma.cc/P7VX-UDYV] (explaining his
beliefs as to why the Corps failed to support its conclusions regarding the
environmental impact of the proposed Dakota Access Pipeline on the Standing Rock
Sioux Reservation); see also Steven Mufson, How the Army Corps of Engineers Wound up in
the Middle of the Fight over the Dakota Access Pipeline, WASH. POST (Feb. 8, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/how-the-army-corps-ofengineers-wound-up-in-the-middle-of-the-fight-over-the-dakota-accesspipeline/2017/02/08/33eaedde-ed8a-11e6-9662-6eedf1627882_story (describing the
nuances and challenges faced by the Army Corps of Engineers while siting projects).
25. See Nicky Woolf, North Dakota Oil Pipeline Protesters Stand Their Ground: ‘This Is
Sacred Land”, GUARDIAN (Aug. 29, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/usnews/2016/aug/29/north-dakota-oil-pipeline-protest-standing-rock-sioux
[https://perma.cc/8SWK-RZEK] (noting that the first camp, Sacred Stone Camp, was
established in April 2016).
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of the Standing Rock reservation and owned by LaDonna Brave Bull
Allard, who had established the camp and invited demonstrators to
join it.26 As numbers swelled at the Sacred Stone site, a second camp,
dubbed Oceti Sakowin, spilled onto land managed by the Army Corps of
Engineers north of the reservation.27 The two camps soon housed
hundreds of residents prepared to stay indefinitely.28 Meanwhile, the
Standing Rock Sioux Tribe filed a federal legal challenge to the project’s
Army Corps permits, seeking to halt and prevent further construction until
a new environmental impact review was completed.29
Construction crews did not wait for a final court decision on the Tribe’s
lawsuit.30 Bulldozers broke ground in early September, setting the stage for
the first serious clashes between protesters and private security forces.31 By
late October, with the 2016 general election looming and lawyers continuing
to battle over the project in court, tensions on the ground had escalated
rapidly.32 Militarized local police equipped with armored vehicles, riot gear,
and sound cannons confronted protesters who had established a blockade
near the camps.33 The number of protest-related arrests approached 300.34
Reports of local law enforcement unlawfully detaining and mistreating
protesters put a spotlight on the conflict, drawing the attention of the United

26. Wong & Levin, supra note 5.
27. Id. (noting also that the Army Corps had leased the land to a private rancher).
28. Woolf, supra note 25 (“Hundreds more join when they can, swelling the camp’s
numbers on weekends. Others come when they get time and bring what supplies they can.”).
29. Motion for Preliminary Injunction Request for Expediting Hearing, Standing
Rock Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, No. 1:16-cv-1534-JEB (D.D.C. Aug. 4,
2016); see also Rebecca Hersher, Key Moments in the Dakota Access Pipeline Fight, NPR (Feb.
22, 2017), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/02/22/514988040 /keymoments-in-the-dakota-access-pipeline-fight [https://perma.cc/TS27-4QXC] (examining
the main historic moments in the Dakota Access Pipeline fight, one of which includes the
Standing Rock Sioux Tribe suing the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers).
30. See Alexander Sammon, A History of Native Americans Protesting the Dakota Access
Pipeline, MOTHER JONES (Sept. 9, 2016), https://www.motherjones.com/
environment/2016/09/dakota-access-pipeline-protest-timeline-sioux-standing-rockjill-stein [https://perma.cc/S3SR-ZZN7] (quoting Jan Hassleman, an attorney for the
Standing Rock Sioux Tribe: “We’re days away from getting a resolution on the legal
issues, and they came in on a holiday weekend and destroyed the site”).
31. Id.
32. See Catherine Thorbecke, 141 Arrested at Dakota Access Protest as Police Move In,
ABC NEWS (Oct. 28, 2016), https://abcnews.go.com/US/tensions-mount-protesterspolice-controversial-pipeline/story?id=43078902 [https://perma.cc/G8ZJ-XWY3].
33. Id.
34. Id.
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Nations’ (UN) Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues.35 The situation
escalated further in late November when police fired rubber bullets, tear gas,
and water cannons at protesters in sub-freezing temperatures.36 Less than two
weeks later, the outgoing Obama Administration denied a final permit for
the pipeline—just ahead of an Army Corps deadline requiring the protesters
to leave the two main campsites.37
Ultimately, however, the newly elected Trump Administration gave
the Dakota Access project a green light in early 2017.38 By the time law
enforcement cleared away the Oceti Sakowin camp on February 23,
2017, an estimated 800 people had been arrested and charged with
various offenses for their participation in the Standing Rock protests.39
Local law enforcement and prosecutors were accused of “an aggressive
campaign” to suppress activism “using drawn-out criminal cases and
lengthy prison sentences.”40 Charges levied against hundreds of
35. See Sam Levin, Dakota Access Pipeline Protests: UN Group Investigates Human Rights
Abuses, GUARDIAN (Oct. 31, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016
/oct/31/dakota-access-pipeline-protest-investigation-human-rights-abuses [https://
perma.cc/3M2Z-FMK3] (detailing the investigation by the UN’s Permanent Forum on
Indigenous Issues into the abuses against pipeline protesters).
36. See Madison Park & Mayra Cuevas, Dakota Access Pipeline Clashes Turn Violent,
CNN (Nov. 22, 2016), https://www.cnn.com/2016/11/21/us/dakota-access-pipelineprotests/index.html [https://perma.cc/Q876-CFQX]; Alan Taylor, Water Cannons
and Tear Gas Used Against Dakota Access Pipeline Protesters, ATLANTIC (Nov. 21,
2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/photo/2016/11/water-cannons-and-tear-gas-usedagainst-dakota-access-pipeline-protesters/508370 [https://perma.cc/769C-U5BW].
37. Kris Maher & Will Connors, Dakota Pipeline Project Halted as Obama
Administration Denies Permit for Last Leg, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 5, 2016),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/obama-administration-moves-to-deny-easement-fordakota-pipeline-1480890468.
38. Brian Naylor, Trump Gives Green Light to Keystone, Dakota Access Pipelines, NPR
(Jan. 24, 2017), https://www.npr.org/2017/01/24/511402501/trump-to-give-greenlight-to-keystone-dakota-access-pipelines [https://perma.cc/F9XZ-7JB4] (noting that
the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe quickly announced that it would “take legal action to
fight Trump’s decision”).
39. See Zoë Carpenter & Tracie Williams, Photos: Since Standing Rock, 56 Bills Have
Been Introduced in 30 States to Restrict Protests, NATION (Feb. 16, 2018),
https://www.thenation.com/article/photos-since-standing-rock-56-bills-have-beenintroduced-in-30-states-to-restrict-protests [https://perma.cc/H67J-RJHV].
40. Sam Levin, ‘He’s a Political Prisoner’: Standing Rock Activists Face Years in Jail,
GUARDIAN (June 22, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2018/jun/22/
standing-rock-jailed-activists-water-protectors [https://perma.cc/B4MS-FR9D]; see also
Colin Moynihan, A Murky Legal Mess at Standing Rock, NEW YORKER (Jan. 11, 2017),
https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/people-arrested-at-standing-rock-protestsfight-for-their-legal-rights [https://perma.cc/T7SJ-52B4] (noting that the legal battles over
individual protesters’ cases reflected “the polarized political dispute over the pipeline”).
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protestors were ultimately dropped, but not before those charged were
forced to live with the specter of potentially lengthy and costly legal
proceedings.41 In some cases, defense attorneys reported a pattern of
protestors seeing charges dropped after they had incurred the upfront
costs of preparing their cases, only to be re-filed at a later date, a
practice a local attorney described as “financial warfare.”42 One state
prosecutor handling the Standing Rock cases argued that protesters
who could not afford their own counsel should be required to
reimburse the state for their court-appointed representation.43
In the wake of the Standing Rock conflict, state legislators across the
country began similarly aggressive campaigns, introducing a flurry of
bills targeting protesters, particularly in states where fossil fuel
infrastructure development was booming. These proposals ranged
from measures that would enable prosecutors to charge demonstrators
under racketeering laws to bills intended to “indemnify drivers who
strike protesters in the street.”44 Some of the proposals were draconian
enough to attract the attention of special rapporteurs from the UN’s
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, who lodged a
complaint with the U.S. Department of State.45
These bills included proposals to penalize anyone who set foot on
land owned—or expropriated—by a pipeline company. Oklahoma was
the first state to act. In early 2017, state legislators began debating
House Bill (HB) 1123, a measure targeting trespass on “critical
41. Jack Dura, DAPL Cases Could Close in 2018, BISMARCK TRIB. (Dec. 28, 2017),
https://bismarcktribune.com/news/local/crime-and-courts/dapl-cases-could-closein/article_6fb1d6e7-e54b-5d16-9869-7f408746aefd.html [https://perma.cc/6KWJ-P2
Y3] (reporting that at the end of 2017 “[o]ver 300 [cases] await dispositions, either
still open or inactive with warrants”).
42. Id.
43. Moynihan, supra note 40 (quoting state’s attorney for McLean County, Ladd
R. Erickson, “[O]ur systems are not set up to be foddered by economic weaponry when
people from around the world come to intentionally commit crimes for political
purposes and have North Dakota taxpayers pick up the tab”).
44. Eliza Newlin Carney, Spate of Anti-Protest Bills Target Social Justice Infrastructure,
SUNLIGHT FOUND. (June 18, 2018), https://sunlightfoundation.com/2018/06/18/ spateof-anti-protest-bills-target-social-justice-infrastructure [https://perma.cc/BTA6-PP5A].
45. See Adam Gabbatt, Anti-Protest Bills Would ‘Attack Right to Speak Out’ Under Donald
Trump, GUARDIAN (May 8, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/may/
08/donald-trump-anti-protest-bills [https://perma.cc/3HK2-FUEG] (stating, “Kaye
and Kiai, special rapporteurs on the freedom of expression and freedom of peaceful
assembly respectively, said the bills represent ‘a worrying trend that could result in a
detrimental impact on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and freedom of
expression in the country’”).

2019] FIRST AMENDMENT CHALLENGES TO STATE TRESPASS LAWS 675
infrastructure.”46 The bill was introduced just days after protesters made
public their intent to protest the Diamond Pipeline, a project that would
break ground in Oklahoma and snake its way to Tennessee.47 The bill’s
principal author, State Representative Scott Briggs, emphasized,
“[A]cross the country, we have seen time and time again these protests
have turned violent, these protests that have disrupted the infrastructure
in those other states . . . . This is a preventative measure . . . to make sure
that doesn’t happen here.”48
The Oklahoma legislature passed HB 1123 in May 2017.49 Because the
legislature approved the bill as an “emergency” measure, it went into
effect as soon as Governor Mary Fallin signed it.50 By early 2018, other
states began jumping on the bandwagon. In January, the American
Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC)—a group funded in part by
fossil fuel giants including ExxonMobil, Shell, and Chevron51—
46. H.B. 1123, 2017 Leg., 56th Sess. (Okla. 2017); see also Joe Wertz, Oklahoma Bill
to Protect ‘Critical Infrastructure’ Could Curb Public Protest, Critics Say, STATEIMPACT
OKLAHOMA: NPR (Mar. 2, 2017), https://stateimpact.npr.org/oklahoma/2017/
03/02/oklahoma-bill-to-protect-critical-infrastructure-could-curb-public-protestcritics-say [https://perma.cc/T72B-62RQ] (discussing the advancement of HB 1123
in the House and what the new bill entails).
47. Nicholas Kusnetz, Harsh New Anti-Protest Laws Restrict Freedom of Speech, Advocates
Say, WASH. POST (Aug. 22, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/energyenvironment/2018/08/22/environmentalists-say-new-pipeline-protest-laws-restricttheir-freedom-speech; Diamond Pipeline, PLAINS ALL AMERICAN PIPELINE, L.P.,
https://www.plainsallamerican.com/about-us/subsidiary-websites/diamond-pipeline
[https://perma.cc/H54L-4HFF].
48. Laura Eastes, Anti-Protest Bills Could Curb Freedom of Speech or Provide Protection in
Oklahoma, OKLA. GAZETTE (Mar. 15, 2017), https://www.okgazette.com/
oklahoma/anti-protest-bills-could-curb-freedom-of-speech-or-provide-protection-inoklahoma/Content?oid=2979832 [https://perma.cc/U6JP-D7BW].
49. See Will Haskell, Legislation in Oklahoma Aims to Protect Critical Infrastructure in
Wake of Environmental Protests, GEO. U. FREE SPEECH PROJECT (Aug. 22, 2017),
https://freespeechproject.georgetown.edu/tracker-entries/legislation-aims-toprotect-critical-infrastructure-in-wake-of-environmental-protests
[https://perma.cc/3M6F-5HSM].
50. Alleen Brown, Oklahoma Governor Signs Anti-Protest Law Imposing Huge Fines on
“Conspirator” Organizations, INTERCEPT (May 6, 2017), https://theintercept.com/2017/
05/06/oklahoma-governor-signs-anti-protest-law-imposing-huge-fines-on-conspiratororganizations [https://perma.cc/4L2W-RJEB].
51. See Peter C. Frumhoff & Naomi Oreskes, Fossil Fuel Firms Are Still Bankrolling
Climate Denial Lobby Groups, GUARDIAN (Mar. 25, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com
/environment/2015/mar/25/fossil-fuel-firms-are-still-bankrolling-climate-deniallobby-groups [https://perma.cc/Q22B-DUB2]; see also Cora Currier, ALEC and
ExxonMobil Push Loopholes in Fracking Chemical Disclosure Rules, PROPUBLICA (Apr. 24, 2012),
https://www.propublica.org/article/alec-and-exxonmobil-push-loopholes-in-fracking-
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published a model critical infrastructure trespass bill “drawing
inspiration from” Oklahoma’s new law.52 In the following months,
legislators in Iowa, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Wyoming, Minnesota, and
Louisiana all introduced variations on critical infrastructure trespass
bills, some modeled after ALEC’s proposal.53
Much like in Oklahoma, Louisiana lawmakers introduced their own
draft critical infrastructure bill amidst concerns over protests against a
major pipeline project in the Bayou State.54 The completed Bayou
Bridge pipeline, another Energy Transfer Partners project, would carry
crude oil across Louisiana’s Atchafalaya Basin, wetlands more
expansive than the Florida Everglades.55 In early 2018, a coalition of
local, state, and national conservation groups filed suit to block
construction, citing potentially irreversible damage to the Basin’s fragile
ecosystem.56 After a district court granted a temporary injunction,
however, the Fifth Circuit overturned the lower court’s decision,
allowing construction to proceed.57
Louisiana passed its critical infrastructure law in August 2018.58
Within just a few weeks, the first protesters were arrested near a Bayou
chemical-disclosure-rules [https://perma.cc/5H2P-2T4V] (describing ExxonMobil’s
direct influence in drafting some of ALEC’s model legislation).
52. See Critical Infrastructure Protection Act, AM. LEGIS. EXCHANGE COUNCIL (Jan. 20, 2018),
https://www.alec.org/model-policy/critical-infrastructure-protection-act
[https://perma.cc/PT8T-3VZ3].
53. Alleen Brown & Will Parrish, Louisiana and Minnesota Introduce Anti-Protest Bills
Amid Fights Over Bayou Bridge and Enbridge Pipelines, INTERCEPT (Mar. 31, 2018),
https://theintercept.com/2018/03/31/louisiana-minnesota-anti-protest-bills-bayoubridge-enbridge-pipelines [https://perma.cc/3LTH-H3AQ]; see also Connor Gibson, State
Bills to Criminalize Peaceful Protest of Oil & Gas “Critical Infrastructure”, POLLUTER WATCH (Feb.
18, 2019), https://polluterwatch.org/State-Bills-Criminalize-Peaceful-Protest-Oil-GasCritical-Infrastructure-pipelines [https://perma.cc/ZT6R-RER8] (stating that nine states
have enacted some form of a critical infrastructure trespass law, including North Dakota,
South Dakota, Oklahoma, Iowa, Louisiana, Indiana, Tennessee, Texas, and Missouri
(current information through August 28, 2019)).
54. Bayou Bridge, ENERGY TRANSFER PARTNERS, web.archive.org/web/
20190321001745/https://www.energytransfer.com/ops_bayou_bridge.aspx
[https://perma.cc/VZE5-ZA65].
55. See Atchafalaya Basin, supra note 1.
56. See Mark Schleifstein, Federal Appeals Court Rules in Favor of Bayou Bridge Pipeline
Construction, NOLA.COM: TIMES-PICAYUNE (July 7, 2018), https://www.nola.com/
environment/2018/07/federal_appeals_court_rules_in.html
[https://perma.cc/2AJF-DQTQ].
57. See Atchafalaya Basinkeeper v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, No. 18-30257 (5th
Cir. July 6, 2018); see also Schleifstein, supra note 56.
58. LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:61 (2019); Lux, supra note 8.
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Bridge pipeline construction site.59 Some of these arrests reportedly
involved protesters being pulled from their kayaks onto an airboat,
despite the fact that navigable waterways in Louisiana are generally
treated as public property. Other arrests occurred on private property
surrounding the pipeline easement, even though the protesters claimed
to have express permission from the landowners to be present.60 Under
the state’s new critical infrastructure law, these protesters each faced
potential felony convictions and up to five years in prison.61
B. The Anatomy of Critical Infrastructure Trespass Laws
1.

Defining “critical infrastructure” and setting draconian penalties
Trespass is already a misdemeanor offense in every state where critical
infrastructure bills have been passed or introduced. Critical
infrastructure trespass laws establish a separate class of penalties to
protect an expansive and less-than-clearly defined range of both private
and public property that is loosely defined as “critical infrastructure.”62
To be charged with critical infrastructure trespass in Oklahoma, for
example, an individual must simply “enter property containing a
critical infrastructure facility without permission by the owner of the
property or lawful occupant thereof.”63
States have taken different approaches to defining “critical
infrastructure,” but a common element is that these definitions are
vague and far-reaching. Critical infrastructure bills proposed to date
have implicated sites as varied, ubiquitous, and poorly defined as
“transportation facilities,”64 “below or aboveground pipeline or
59. Lux, supra note 8.
60. Id.; John Haughey, Pipeline Protesters’ Trespassing Arrests Are First Test of State’s New
Felony Law, CENTER SQUARE: LA WATCHDOG (Sept. 24, 2018), https://www.
thecentersquare.com/louisiana/pipeline-protesters-trespassing-arrests-are-first-test-ofstate-s/article_61ea48b2-c036-11e8-ad1d-3b9e6054cd9e.html [https://perma.cc/S6
X5-7ZHG] (“‘I am very much against the Bayou Bridge Pipeline endangering the
Louisiana wetlands and possible destroying not only the water, but the abundant
wildlife in the area,’ said Theda Wright, a landowner who gave the ‘Water Protectors’
written permission to be on her property.”); see also LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 450 (2018)
(stating that “[p]ublic things that belong to the state are such as running waters, the waters
and bottoms of natural navigable water bodies, the territorial sea, and the seashore”).
61. Lux, supra note 8.
62. Brown, supra note 50.
63. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1792 (West 2019); see also LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:61 (2018)
(“[I]ntentional entry by a person without authority into any structure or onto any premises,
belonging to another, that constitutes in whole or in part a critical infrastructure . . . .”).
64. LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:61 (2018).
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piping,”65 and “electric power lines and associated equipment
infrastructure.”66 Louisiana is home to roughly 50,000 miles of intrastate
pipelines alone.67 Across the country, that number skyrockets to nearly
two million miles of oil and gas pipelines, according to the United States
Department of Transportation.68 Louisiana’s law reaches still further to
include “any and all structures, equipment, or other immovable or
movable property” located on any property containing structures
defined as “critical infrastructure” or “any site where the construction or
improvement of any such facility or structure . . . is occurring.”69 As a
result, in the context of pipelines, Louisiana’s law reaches far beyond
operational pipelines to include any pipeline construction site or any
property where any piece of material or equipment that might be used
to construct a pipeline is being stored. In Iowa, critical infrastructure
similarly includes “[a]ny land, building, conveyance, or other
temporary or permanent structure whether publicly or privately
owned, that contains, houses, supports, or is appurtenant to any critical
infrastructure.”70 Such vague and overbroad definitions do not add
clarity to the scope of these laws; instead, they implicate a vast amount
of both private and public property.
Additionally, legislatures in states like Idaho71 and Iowa72 have
proposed critical infrastructure bills that go beyond trespass to
encompass acts of “impeding critical infrastructure” and “critical
infrastructure sabotage.”73 These provisions reach an even broader and
65. Critical Infrastructure Protection Act, supra note 52.
66. Id.
67. Louisiana: Pipeline to the Nation, STATE OF LA. DEP’T OF NAT. RESOURCES, http://
www.dnr.louisiana.gov/index.cfm/page/150 [https://perma.cc/H85G-ZPZS].
68. U.S. Oil and Gas Pipeline Mileage, U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP.,
https://www.bts.gov/content/us-oil-and-gas-pipeline-mileage [https://perma.cc/NC7LGX6C].
69. H.B. 727, 2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (La. 2018).
70. IOWA CODE ANN. § 716.11 (West 2018).
71. See Phil Haunschild, Senate Bill 1090 - Critical Infrastructure Trespass, IDAHO
FREEDOM FOUND. (Mar. 7, 2019), https://idahofreedom.org/senate-bill-1090-criticalinfrastructure-trespass [https://perma.cc/CMS3-T4CU] (examining Idaho’s posed
addition of “impeding critical infrastructure” to its current critical infrastructure law).
72. See S.F. 2235, 87th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Iowa 2018), https://www.
legis.iowa.gov/docs/publications/LGI/87/SF2235.pdf
[https://perma.cc/U6WKLL4P] (labeling Iowa’s proposed bill as “critical infrastructure sabotage”).
73. Id.; see William Petroski, Bill Banning Sabotage of Pipelines, ‘Critical Infrastructure’ Passes
Iowa Senate, DES MOINES REG. (Feb. 21, 2018), https://www.desmoinesregister
.com/story/news/politics/2018/02/21/bill-banning-pipeline-sabotage-criticalinfrastructure-passes-iowa-senate/354510002 [https://perma.cc/4MV7-C2CR] (explaining
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even less clearly defined assortment of property and expressive conduct,
such as peaceful protests on access roads or other adjacent properties.74
In Texas, a group of protestors who rappelled from a bridge near
various oil refineries now faces charges for “disrupting critical
infrastructure” because shipping traffic was interrupted.75
Potential financial penalties for critical infrastructure trespass also
far exceed those for misdemeanor trespass.76 Possible fines range from
$1000 to $10,000 for individuals.77 In Iowa, those convicted of critical
infrastructure sabotage “shall be punished by a fine of not less than
eighty-five thousand dollars.”78 Potential prison time for those
convicted under critical infrastructure trespass laws ranges anywhere
from six months, for those states whose laws include a misdemeanor
charge, to more than five years.79
Iowa’s proposed bill’s definition of “critical infrastructure sabotage” is “any unauthorized act
intended to cause substantial interruption or impairment of service rendered to the
public relating to critical infrastructure property”); see also Andrew Graham, Industry
Backs Bill Criminalizing Infrastructure ‘Interference’, WYOFILE (Feb. 20, 2018),
https://www.wyofile.com/industry-backs-bill-criminalizing-infrastructureinterference [https://perma.cc/4NJ9-HCEJ] (describing Wyoming’s proposed bill to
“impose severe penalties on protesters and anyone else who damages or interferes with
‘critical infrastructure’ such as a pipeline or a mine”).
74. Andrew Graham, ‘Critical Infrastructure’ Bill Resurfaces, CASTER STAR-TRIB. (Dec.
24,
2018),
https://trib.com/news/state-and-regional/govt-and-politics/criticalinfrastructure-bill-resurfaces/article_e95b2fe3-0f0f-52a2-8259-ab8c074e4793.html
[https://perma.cc/2HK9-N4NT] (noting that “a protest that blocked a pipeline
construction project and cost a pipeline company more than $1,000 could be
prosecuted as a felony even with less than $1,000 of physical damage”).
75. Mose Buchele, Activists Say New Laws to Protect Critical Infrastructure Aim to Silence
Them, CAPITAL PUBLIC RADIO (Sept. 25, 2019), http://www.capradio.org/
news/npr/story?storyid=763530303 [https://perma.cc/NH4C-CTZP].
76. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1792 (West 2019).
77. See id. (naming the range of monetary fines that can be imposed on an
individual for critical infrastructure trespass).
78. IOWA CODE ANN. § 716.12 (West 2019); see also William Petroski, Banning
Sabotage of ‘Critical Infrastructure’ Passes Iowa Senate, DES MOINES REGISTER (Feb. 21,
2018), https://www.desmoinesregister.com/story/news/politics/2018/02/21/billbanning-pipeline-sabotage-critical-infrastructure-passes-iowa-senate/354510002
[https://perma.cc/4D5Z-GRXL] (quoting state Senator Robert Hogg’s concerns that
the bill “could result in nonviolent protesters being prosecuted for circumstances that
simply represented trespassing and a ‘bare intention,’” and efforts to amend the law
to protect individuals who do not cause any damage as well as individuals “protesting
eminent domain while on their own property”).
79. Id. (defining critical infrastructure sabotage as a class “B” felony, punishable
up to twenty-five years); LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:61 (2018) (citing the penalty for critical
infrastructure trespass as a maximum of five years); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1792
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Some statutes, like Louisiana’s, include provisions noting that
“lawful assembly” is protected by the U.S. Constitution, but such
provisions do little to clarify for the public exactly when, where, and
how these critical infrastructure laws might transform an ordinary act
of protest into a felony.
2.

Consequences for organizations
In addition to severe penalties for individuals, most critical
infrastructure trespass bills include harsh penalties for organizations
affiliated with individuals charged under these laws. Oklahoma’s HB 1123
includes a provision that states that any organization “found to be a
conspirator with persons who are found to have committed” any of the
individual offenses described in the statute “shall be” fined up to ten times
the maximum penalty faced by the individual—in other words, up to
$1,000,000 per case.80 Under Oklahoma law, conspiracy merely requires
“any agreement, combination or common plan or scheme by two or
more persons, coupled with an overt act in furtherance of such
agreement . . . to violate any section of this act.”81 ALEC included the
“conspirator” provision in its model bill.82
A whole host of otherwise lawful activities routinely undertaken by
advocacy organizations, from coordinating peaceful protests to
training people how to engage in nonviolent civil disobedience to simply
offering material support such as food and water to demonstrators,
could create massive liability for an organization as soon as one
demonstrator steps over the wrong property line.83
These three elements—expansive definitions of what constitutes
“critical infrastructure,” felony penalties for individuals, and vicarious
liability for organizations—have each cropped up in multiple states’
proposed critical infrastructure trespass laws. Each raises significant
First Amendment concerns.

(classifying critical infrastructure trespass penalties as six months in jail for a
misdemeanor charge and one year for a felony charge).
80. H.B. 1123, 2017 Leg., 56th Sess. (Ok. 2017).
81. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 988 (West 2019).
82. Critical Infrastructure Protection Act, supra note 52.
83. Legislative Briefer, “Guilt by Association” Critical Infrastructure Bills and the Right
to Protest, INT’L CTR. FOR NOT-FOR-PROFIT L. (Sept. 2018), http://www.icnl.org
/programs/US%20Programs/Critical%20Infrastructure%20Legislative%20Briefer.p
df [https://perma.cc/EZ28-YSSA] (examining liability for those who organize or
support protests).
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C. Analyzing Laws Under the First Amendment
Acts of protest and the First Amendment have a long and complicated
history. While the First Amendment only specifically references protections
for “speech,” the Supreme Court has long recognized that First
Amendment protections reach beyond “the spoken or written word.”84
Expressive conduct, like an act of protest, is central to the Supreme
Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence.85 When laws regulate conduct
that is not clearly expressive, however, First Amendment challenges
become more complicated.
Political expression is generally protected by the First Amendment.86
Yet, the conduct accompanying protesters’ political expression is less
well protected, particularly in cases involving acts of civil disobedience.
Courts typically treat laws that purport to regulate only conduct, even if
they might also implicate speech or expressive conduct, as contentneutral laws subject to intermediate, rather than strict scrutiny.87 Under
intermediate scrutiny, courts must ask whether a law is “justified without
reference to the content of the regulated speech,” is “narrowly tailored
to serve a significant governmental interest,” and leaves open “ample
alternative channels for communication of the information.”88 The
Supreme Court has further clarified that “narrowly tailored” is not as
exacting a standard under intermediate scrutiny as under strict
scrutiny; under intermediate scrutiny, a regulation passes muster
provided it is not “substantially broader than necessary to achieve the
government’s interest.”89 By contrast, a regulation subject to strict
scrutiny must be “the least restrictive or least intrusive means” of
achieving a legitimate governmental interest.90
A similar sliding scale exists regarding how compelling the
government’s interest in enacting a particular regulation must be in

84. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989).
85. See id.; see also United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 385 (1968) (holding that the
destruction of selective service certificates was not “inevitably or necessarily expressive”
conduct and, therefore, the statute at issue did not conflict with the First Amendment).
86. See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 329 (2010) (“[P]olitical speech . . . is
central to the meaning and purpose of the First Amendment.”).
87. Barbara J. Katz, Civil Disobedience and the First Amendment, 32 UCLA L. REV. 904,
904–05 (1985) (“For the most part, the courts have refused to recognize the First
Amendment as a defense in situations where the law violated is itself regarded as a
valid law not aimed at the denial of speech—for example, a trespass law.”).
88. Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984).
89. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 800 (1989).
90. Id. at 798.
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order to justify its restrictions on either speech or expressive conduct.91
In United States v. O’Brien,92 the Supreme Court held that a law imposing
criminal penalties for burning draft cards was constitutional despite the
conduct having expressive elements—in O’Brien’s case, publicly
burning his draft card to express his opposition to the draft and the
Vietnam War.93 The Court held that “when ‘speech’ and ‘nonspeech’
elements are combined in the same course of conduct, a sufficiently
important governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech element
can justify incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms.”94 The
Court does not define a ”sufficiently important governmental interest,”
although it acknowledges this lack of precision and cites several other
terms that are comparable: “compelling; substantial; subordinating;
paramount; cogent; strong.”95 The O’Brien test still governs the Court’s
analysis of laws that place a burden on “expressive conduct”—such as
acts of protest meant to communicate a political message—in order to
balance the value of laws that uniformly regulate certain types of
conduct against “the undue suppression of opinions or ideas.”96
While the substantial government interest in regulating certain
conduct must be “unrelated to the suppression of free expression,” the
degree to which courts have been willing to question legislatures’
asserted intent is minimal. The Supreme Court has also noted that it
would not “strike down an otherwise constitutional statute on the basis
of an alleged illicit legislative motive.”97 This reasoning has limited
courts’ willingness to examine legislatures’ motives in passing laws that,
on their face, assert a valid governmental interest in regulating conduct,
even if the legislative history might reveal other primary motives.

91. Id.
92. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
93. Katz, supra note 87, at 910.
94. O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 376.
95. Id. at 376–77 (emphasizing that even though the court’s ruling may be
imprecise, a government regulation is “justified” when it (1) falls within the
government’s constitutional powers, (2) furthers a significant government interest
that “is unrelated to the suppression of free expression,” and (3) is “no greater than
necessary” to further that interest).
96. Daniel J. Hay, Note, Baptizing O’Brien: Towards Intermediate Protection of
Religiously Motivated Expressive Conduct, 68 VAND. L. REV. 177, 179 (2015).
97. O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 377, 383.
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1.

Trespass and the First Amendment
Trespass laws, generally, are no exception to the relatively underprotective rules governing the First Amendment analysis of facially
content-neutral, conduct-oriented laws. Additionally, under most
circumstances, the First Amendment “does not shield the exercise of
speech on private property.”98 This is true even for acts of trespass
intended to communicate a political message.
Nevertheless, this line of precedent has several critical caveats.99 When
private property is not used solely for private purposes, the Court has
been less absolute in its jurisprudence. In Marsh v. Alabama,100 the Court
held that a private company town could not invoke a state trespassing
statute to prevent leafleting on sidewalks, even though the sidewalks in
this case were technically private property.101 Writing for the majority,
Justice Hugo Black asserted that “[w]hen we balance the Constitutional
rights of owners of property against those of the people to enjoy [First
Amendment rights], as we must here, we remain mindful of the fact that
the latter occupy a preferred position.”102 The Court emphasized the
functional nature of the property in question, noting that while a private
company might own title to the town and its sidewalks, the town
otherwise operated just like any other town, and common spaces like
sidewalks functioned like shared public areas where First Amendment
protections are guaranteed in other communities.103 Justice Frankfurter,
in a concurring opinion, added that “the technical distinctions on which
a finding of ‘trespass’ so often depends are too tenuous to control
decision[s] regarding the scope of the vital liberties guaranteed by the
Constitution.”104 The Court extended this balancing test to a privatelyowned but publicly accessible shopping center in Amalgamated Food
Employees Union v. Logan Valley Plaza.105

98. Joseph H. Hart, Free Speech on Private Property—When Fundamental Rights Collide,
68 TEX. L. REV. 1469, 1471 (1990).
99. Id. at 1470 (“The United States Supreme Court has wrestled for decades with
the meaning of the first amendment and the protections it affords to expression on
private property.”).
100. 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
101. Id. at 502–10.
102. Id. at 509.
103. Id. at 507–08 (holding that both municipalities and corporations have identical
interests in maintaining free and functional channels of communication when acting
as owner of a town).
104. Id. at 511 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
105. 391 U.S. 308 (1968).
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The Court has since distinguished and narrowed its holdings in
Marsh and especially Logan Valley, perhaps most notably in Lloyd Corp.
v. Tanner106 and Hudgens v. NLRB.107 It has not, however, gone so far as
to abandon its balancing of constitutional interests in such cases. In
Lloyd Corp., the majority emphasized that First Amendment safeguards
place limits on state action, not on owners of “private property used
nondiscriminatorily for private purposes only.”108 The Court reiterated
this holding in Hudgens, where the majority further stated that the
decision in Lloyd Corp. amounted to a “total rejection” of the holding in
Logan Valley—even though the Court in Lloyd explicitly distinguished
Logan Valley rather than overruling it.109 Nonetheless, the Hudgens
Court clearly employs the same balancing test followed by both Logan
Valley and Lloyd Corp., though with different results, to hold that “the
pickets in the present case did not have a First Amendment right to enter
this shopping center for the purpose of advertising their strike . . . .”110
As Justice White notes in his concurrence, this outcome would have
been the same had the majority explicitly adopted the balancing test
employed in Logan Valley.111
Additionally, most First Amendment trespass cases involving facilities
designated by federal and state governments as “critical,” high-security
properties have dealt with facilities such as military bases and jails, where
the compelling government interest in preventing trespass is either
central to the nature of the property—as with jails—or is a government
interest to which courts have historically been very deferential, such as
national security.112 Though O’Brien did not deal with trespass, the Court
repeatedly emphasized that the “power of Congress to raise and
support armies and to make all laws necessary and proper to that end
is broad and sweeping.”113 Similarly in Adderley v. Florida,114 the Court
upheld trespass convictions for students arrested while protesting on

106. 407 U.S. 551 (1972) (involving the right to distribute anti-war handbills in a
privately-owned shopping center).
107. 424 U.S. 507, 508 (1976) (involving the rights of union members to picket
inside a privately-owned shopping mall); see also Hart, supra note 97, at 1470–71.
108. 407 U.S. at 567.
109. 424 U.S. at 518–19.
110. Id. at 520–21 (emphasis added).
111. Id. at 524 (White, J., concurring).
112. Katz, supra note 87, at 912–13 n.56 (citing several cases upholding trespass
convictions involving government facilities).
113. United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
114. 385 U.S. 39 (1966).
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the premises of a local jail.115 The Court highlighted the secure nature
of the facility and the fact that the public did not have open access to
the jail, despite it being public property.116 The Court relied on similar
facts in United States v. Apel,117 which involved an antiwar activist
charged with trespassing on property controlled by Vandenberg Air
Force Base.118 The Court noted that Vandenberg had been designated
as a “closed base” due to its “sensitive missile and space launch
facilities,” a designation that extended to areas around the base to
which the military allowed conditional public access, but over which
the base Commander retained ultimate authority.119 However, had
either Apel or O’Brien involved a less sensitive government interest, or
had Adderley involved a type of property where security and lack of
public access were less integral to the government’s interest, these
cases might have turned out differently.
While the above cases make it clear that laws regulating trespass
generally fall outside the scope of the First Amendment, it is also clear
that this is not an absolute, hard-and-fast rule, and that a balancing of
fundamental rights, government interests, and the specific character
of the property at issue is necessary.
It should also be noted when “balanc[ing] the Constitutional rights
of owners of property against those of the people to enjoy [First
Amendment rights],” that the penalties in all of the trespassing cases
discussed above were misdemeanor convictions or fines.120 The
protestors in Adderley faced misdemeanor trespassing charge and a
$100 fine or a maximum three months in jail.121 The protestor in Apel
faced less than $500 in fines and no more than six months in jail, even
after multiple incidents.122 None of these cases approached the severity of
penalties threatened by critical infrastructure bills. In assessing whether
content-neutral regulations impose merely “incidental limitations” on
First Amendment rights, the penalties imposed must also be considered.

115. Id. at 40.
116. Id. at 41 (“Traditionally, state capitol grounds are open to the public. Jails, built for
security purposes, are not . . . . Here the demonstrators entered the jail grounds through a
driveway used only for jail purposes and without warning to or permission from the sheriff.”).
117. 571 U.S. 359 (2014).
118. Id. at 364.
119. Id. at 361–62.
120. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 509 (1946).
121. Adderley, 385 U.S. at 40 n.1.
122. United States v. Apel, 371 U.S. 359, 365 (2014).
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2.

Vagueness and overbreadth
Another pair of doctrines often invoked in protest and civil
disobedience cases are vagueness and overbreadth. The key constitutional
questions in assessing vagueness and overbreadth are whether a law
implicates too much protected expression, whether it fails to put the
public on notice regarding what kinds of conduct are prohibited, and
whether it enables discriminatory enforcement.123 Vagueness and
overbreadth challenges are not only critical tools for those who have been
subject to unconstitutional laws but also for those who wish to
preemptively challenge the application of vague and overbroad laws in
future cases, based on the laws’ potential to discourage constitutionally
protected speech and expressive conduct before it even takes place.124
Different courts have recognized the harm posed by this “chilling
effect” to different degrees and in a variety of contexts. In National
Student Ass’n v. Hershey,125 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit noted that “[t]he peculiar feature of suits alleging a
First Amendment chilling effect . . . is that if the allegation is correct,
immediate and real injury is done to the plaintiff’s interests if he does
not speak or act as he says he wants to.”126
Of these two doctrines, overbreadth is uniquely concerned with the First
Amendment. For a law to be overbroad, it must reach constitutionallyprotected conduct even if its stated intent is to regulate activities that are
“constitutionally subject to regulation.”127 Yet, overbreadth challenges are
an uphill battle, as the doctrine has “long rested on the periphery of First
Amendment law.”128 In Broadrick v. Oklahoma,129 the Court emphasized that

123. See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108–09, 112, 114 (1972).
124. Harold Naill Falls, Jr., First Amendment Vagueness and Overbreadth: Theoretical
Revisions by the Burger Court, 31 VAND. L. REV. 609, 610 (1978) (noting that overbroad and
vague laws present a number of dangers to expression, such as “inordinate discretionary
power to enforcement officials,” potentially applying to “constitutionally protected
activit[ies]” and “chill[ing]” or discouraging “the exercise of first amendment freedoms”).
125. 412 F.2d 1103 (D.D.C. 1969).
126. Id. at 1111 (adding that injury “may result from the threat of enforcement
itself, even if that threat never materializes”).
127. Falls, supra note 123, at 610 (citing NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288, 302
(1964)) (“The modern Court repeatedly has expressed the principle that ‘a
governmental purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally subject to
regulation may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and
thereby invade the area of protected freedoms.’”).
128. Alan K. Chen, Statutory Speech Bubbles, First Amendment Overbreadth, and Improper
Legislative Purpose, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 31, 31 (2003).
129. 413 U.S. 601 (1973).
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the baseline rules for challenging a law as overbroad are stringent and that
the Court is reluctant to strike down a law due to overbreadth except
under extreme circumstances.130 The Court refers to the application of
the doctrine as “strong medicine . . . employed by the Court sparingly
and only as a last resort,” because the result of such a holding typically
involves striking down the challenged law in its entirety.131 In Broadrick,
the Court upheld a state statute governing state employees’ political
activities on the grounds that appellants had failed to demonstrate that
the law was substantially overbroad.132 However, the overbreadth
doctrine remains a powerful tool in cases where parties can successfully
invoke it. The Court has identified two significant factors it considers in
addressing overbreadth: whether a law allows for excessive enforcement
discretion and whether the statute in question imposes criminal
sanctions.133 In United States v. Robel,134 the Court held a law to be
overbroad due to its blanket prohibition on “all types of association with
Communist-action groups” for individuals with jobs in designated
“defense facilities,” without regard to “the quality and degree” of an
individual’s group membership or the nature of their job.135 In his
concurrence, Justice Brennan added that delegating sole authority to
the Secretary of Defense to designate “defense facilities” created “the
danger of overbroad, unauthorized, and arbitrary application of
criminal sanctions in an area of protected freedoms”—in that case,
freedom of association.136 Justice Brennan added that due to the
statute’s lack of any “meaningful standard” by which authorities would
determine what facilities would receive such designations as well as the
absence of any procedures “to contest or review” those designations, the
law was overbroad and thus invalid.137 Similarly, in City of Houston v. Hill,138
130. Id. at 613.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 602, 609, 618 (“It may be that such restrictions are impermissible and
that § 818 may be susceptible of some other improper applications. But, as presently
construed, we do not believe that § 818 must be discarded in toto because some persons’
arguably protected conduct may or may not be caught or chilled by the statute.”).
133. Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 119 (2003) (“We have provided this expansive
remedy out of concern that the threat of enforcement of an overbroad law may deter
or ‘chill’ constitutionally protected speech-—especially when the overbroad statute
imposes criminal sanctions.”).
134. 389 U.S. 258 (1967).
135. Id. at 262, 267.
136. Id. at 272 (Brennan, J., concurring).
137. Id. at 272–73.
138. 482 U.S. 451 (1987).
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the Court held that a municipal ordinance was substantially overbroad in
part due to the “unguided discretion” of police in enforcing the statute.139
While courts have been particularly reluctant to embrace overbreadth
challenges in cases involving “ordinary criminal laws,” such as trespass,
these laws do not fully escape First Amendment scrutiny simply because
they regulate “ordinary” criminal conduct.140 In such cases, the Court
has typically employed a case-by-case inquiry that results in a reversed
conviction if a specific individual’s conduct under the particular
circumstances should have been protected.141 This approach allows for
the “ordinary” criminal law at issue to remain in place, which would
not be the case if a court sustained an overbreadth challenge.142
However, the “ordinary criminal laws” considered in this line of
precedent typically involve common misdemeanor offenses, such as
common-law breach of the peace143 or violating anti-noise ordinances.144
Few of these cases involve laws that rise to the level of a potential felony
conviction or hefty five- to six-figure fines. And despite the Court’s
articulated reluctance to strike down “ordinary criminal laws” as
overbroad, in Hill, the Court nonetheless emphasized that “[c]riminal
statutes must be scrutinized with particular care . . . those that make
unlawful a substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct may
be held facially invalid even if they also have a legitimate application.”145

139. Id. at 465–67 (noting that the Court “appreciate[s] the difficulties of drafting precise
laws” but nonetheless has “repeatedly invalidated laws that provide the police with unfettered
discretion to arrest individuals for words or conduct that annoy or offend them”).
140. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613 (1973) (“[O]verbreadth claims, if
entertained at all, have been curtailed when invoked against ordinary criminal laws
that are sought to be applied to protected conduct.”).
141. Id. at 614 (describing the cases Edwards v. South Carolina and Cox v. Louisiana,
the Court notes that it “considered in detail the State’s evidence and in each case
concluded that the conduct at issue could not itself be punished under a breach-of-thepeace statute. On that basis, the judgments affirming the convictions were reversed”).
142. Id. at 613–15.
143. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 300–03, 307–08 (1940) (holding that a
man who played a phonograph record for two passing men, after obtaining their
permission to do so, was not guilty of a breach of the peace even though the record
upset the two men because it insulted their religious beliefs).
144. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 106–08, 121 (1972) (finding that
Rockford’s “modest” anti-noise ordinance, which prohibited the “‘making of any noise
or diversion’” that is likely to disturb the operations of a school while class is in session,
is valid on its face because it is intended to protect normal school activities).
145. 482 U.S at 459.
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3.

Organizational freedom of speech and association
First Amendment protections for organizations and their members
have historically proven to be fairly robust. These protections extend not
only to individuals in their role as members of an organization but to
organizations themselves. As a baseline rule, the First Amendment
protects political organizations’ freedom of speech just as it protects their
members’ freedom of speech.146 In NAACP v. Button,147 faced with efforts
by the Virginia state legislature to target the NAACP and neutralize the
organization’s aggressive litigation efforts in promotion of civil rights, the
Court held that the First Amendment protects both “vigorous advocacy”
as well as “the right ‘to engage in association for the advancement of
beliefs and ideas.’”148 As Justice Harlan emphasized in his dissenting
opinion, “[f]reedom of expression embraces more than the right of an
individual to speak his mind. It includes also his right to advocate and his
right to join with his fellows in an effort to make that advocacy effective.”149
When faced with the question of organizations’ liability for the actions
of individuals, the Court has broadly indicated that the acts of a few are
not, by themselves, sufficient to indict an entire organization or its
advocacy efforts. In NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co.,150 the Court
upheld demonstrators’ right to organize an economic boycott under the
First Amendment despite allegations of violence by certain boycott
participants and charges that the boycott amounted to “malicious
interference with the plaintiffs’ businesses.”151 Regarding the acts of
violence, evidence demonstrated that certain supporters of the boycott
“discipline[d]” those who did not participate in the boycott using
tactics such as throwing bricks through home windows and beating
individuals in the street.152 Nonetheless, Justice Stevens wrote for the
majority, an “effort to change the social, political, and economic
structure of a local environment cannot be characterized as a violent
conspiracy simply by reference to the ephemeral consequences of
relatively few violent acts.”153 The Court was not willing to impose
146. See, e.g., NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 428–29 (1963).
147. 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
148. Id. at 429–30.
149. Id. at 452 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (emphasizing that certain types of associative
conduct, even when accompanying otherwise protected speech, may nonetheless be
constitutionally regulated).
150. 458 U.S. 886 (1982).
151. Id. at 890–91, 907–09, 911.
152. Id. at 904–06.
153. Id. at 933.
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liability on the NAACP for individuals’ actions during the course of an
advocacy effort that was otherwise “uniformly peaceful and orderly.”154
4.

Content neutrality and the question of legislative intent
Though courts have been hesitant to look beyond the face of a law
when asking whether the regulation is content-based or contentneutral,155 particularly if the law only regulates conduct, there is some key
precedent for peeling back the veil of legislative intent in the First
Amendment context. In Wallace v. Jaffree,156 the Supreme Court found that
the expansion of an existing state statute to explicitly include “voluntary
prayer” violated the First Amendment’s Establishment Clause because the
law as previously written was already broad enough to allow for voluntary
prayer.157 The Court cited the initial law as one type of evidence of
impermissible intent, noting that the law had been sufficiently broad to
indicate that the only purpose of expanding it further was to endorse a
religious practice.158 The Court also noted that there was evidence in the
legislative record to demonstrate the bill sponsor’s impermissible intent—
“‘to return voluntary prayer’ to the public schools.”159 The Court
specifically referenced an evidentiary hearing conducted by the District
Court during which the lower court heard from the bill’s sponsor, who
admitted that he had “no other purpose in mind” for the bill aside from
returning prayer to schools.160 The weight of these two types of evidence,
taken together, was sufficient to pierce the otherwise largely impenetrable
veil of legislative intent.161
Additionally, while the Court has expressed a general unwillingness to
dig into legislative intent when determining whether a law was meant to
target protected First Amendment activities, Wallace is not the only case in
which the Court has—even if less explicitly—considered non-textual
evidence in assessing a law’s purpose and breadth in a First Amendment
context. In Broadrick, in determining whether a statute was overbroad, the
154. Id. at 903.
155. United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 382–83 (1968) (expressing an
unwillingness to strike down a law under the First Amendment “on the basis of an
alleged illicit legislative motive”).
156. 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
157. Id. at 40, 59–61 (1985) (noting that the first statute, enacted in 1978, “authorized
a 1-minute period of silence in all public schools ‘for meditation’” while the second statute,
enacted in 1981, authorized a period of silence “for mediation or voluntary prayer”).
158. Id. at 58–59.
159. Id. at 56–57.
160. Id. at 43.
161. Id. at 59–61.
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Court referenced several statements that went beyond the actual text of the
law in question.162 The Court quoted both the State Personnel Board and
the State’s Attorney General’s interpretations of the law and its scope; these
interpretations narrowed the statute’s theoretical application and thus
weighed against a finding of overbreadth.163 In referencing these remarks,
Justice White, writing for the majority, plainly stated, “Surely a court cannot
be expected to ignore these authoritative pronouncements in
determining the breadth of a statute.”164 If courts will consider such nontextual statements in their efforts to avoid striking down a law as
unconstitutional, they should also consider similarly “authoritative
pronouncements” when they attest to an unconstitutional purpose.
II. ANALYSIS
While critical infrastructure trespass laws present significant challenges
to those who wish to contest these laws under the First Amendment, there
are several potential paths forward that could prove vital in protecting
citizens’ rights to protest against infrastructure projects that may have
profound implications for their communities’ welfare.
A. Critical Infrastructure Trespass Laws Are Overbroad, Implicating a
Substantial Amount of Protected Expression While Giving Law Enforcement
an Impermissible Amount of Enforcement Discretion
Pipelines are not like the other self-contained facilities—such as
chemical plants or water treatment facilities—that are protected under
pre-existing critical infrastructure bills. Nor are they confined to highsecurity properties like those examined in Adderley,165 or discreet tracts
of private property as in Lloyd.166 Pipelines, by definition, cross numerous
types of property, including property where protected expression could
otherwise occur. Pipelines run beneath public sidewalks,167 through

162. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 617 (1973).
163. Id. at 617 (noting that the Personnel Board had construed the law at issue to permit
“virtually any expression not within the context of active partisan political campaigning,”
and the Attorney General only prohibited “clearly partisan political activity”).
164. Id. at 618.
165. Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966).
166. Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972).
167. Alana Laflore, Gas Pipeline Project in Historic Northeast Leaves Sidewalks a Mess and
Neighbors Irked, FOX4KC (Aug. 23, 2019), https://fox4kc.com/2019/08/23/gaspipeline-project-in-historic-northeast-leaves-sidewalks-a-mess-and-neighbors-irked
[https://perma.cc/3LF8-XYNS].
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backyards,168 past neighborhood playgrounds,169 near vital groundwater
sources,170 and through critical watersheds.171 Yet critical infrastructure
trespass laws do not distinguish between trespassing on or interfering
with pipeline easements that run through public or private lands, or
private lands abutting public lands. They do not distinguish between
pieces of property that have been purchased in their entirety by energy
companies and property over which the energy company holds an
easement. Nor do they account for the fact that some landowners are
willing hosts, while others have been coerced through exercise of
eminent domain. As a result, the statutes reach both publicly accessible
lands and private lands to which landowners have granted public
access and thus implicate substantially more protected First
Amendment expression than typical trespass statutes, with far more
serious potential consequences.
1.

The full scope of affected property is vague and overbroad
Two key provisions common to critical infrastructure statutes are
demonstrably vague and overbroad, implicating a substantial amount of
property on which expressive conduct would otherwise be protected, while
at the same time giving policing entities too much enforcement discretion.
Louisiana’s “any site” and “any and all structures, equipment, or other
immovable or movable property” language illustrates how these statutes
reach a significant amount of property that might otherwise afford
protesters First Amendment protections for expressive conduct. As in
Robel, the full scope of property that could fall within the reach of critical

168. Andrew Maykuth, Approved in Pa. and Blocked in N.Y., a Contentious Shale Project
Hangs in the Balance, PHILA. INQUIRER (Mar. 25, 2017), https://www.inquirer
.com/philly/business/energy/Contentious-Constitution-Pipeline-Marcellus-Shaleproject-hangs-in-legal-limbo.html [https://perma.cc/8AF8-LTS2] (describing how
pipeline construction crews cleared “about three acres of trees” on property housing
a family-run maple farm).
169. Frank Kummer, Pa. Nuns Protest Gas Pipeline with Last-Ditch ‘Chapel’, PHIL. INQUIRER
(July 14, 2017), https://www.inquirer.com/philly/health/environment/pa-nuns-protestgas-pipeline-with-last-ditch-chapel-20170714.html [https://perma.cc/V2M7-YVN3] (noting
that a “small township park” is adjacent to the pipeline easement).
170. Steven Mufson, Keystone XL Pipeline May Threaten Aquifer that Irrigates Much of the
Central U.S., WASH. POST (Aug. 6, 2012), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/
health-science/keystone-xl-pipeline-may-threaten-aquifer-that-irrigates-much-of-thecentral-us/2012/08/06/7bf0215c-d4db-11e1-a9e3-c5249ea531ca.
171. David Lohr, Bayou Bridge Pipeline Threatens the Riches of Louisiana’s Atchafalaya
Basin, HUFFPOST (Sept. 21, 2018), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/bayou-bridgepipeline-louisiana_n_5ba4560be4b0375f8f9b8588 [https://perma.cc/Y865-GYXN].
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infrastructure laws is unclear but undeniably vast.172 Pipelines are rarely
constructed on property already belonging to pipeline companies;
instead, constructing a pipeline typically requires crossing public lands
or claiming easements through many private landowners’ properties
along the pipeline route.173 In Robel, the Government justified the
statute’s breadth by arguing that it served a critical national security
purpose; to this, the Court replied that “[e]ven the war power does not
remove constitutional limitations safeguarding essential liberties.”174 In
the case of critical infrastructure trespass laws, the justification is far less
compelling, particularly when it comes to pipeline construction sites.
Pipeline construction sites have not traditionally required, nor have they
received, a security status comparable to nuclear facilities or military
bases. The government may certainly have a compelling interest in
protecting operational pipelines to the extent that interference with
such infrastructure could endanger those nearby.175 However, this
interest does not justify imposing felony penalties for protesters who
simply stray too close to a pipeline easement or who approach
construction equipment nearby.
Frequently, as in Louisiana, landowners will not voluntarily agree to
grant pipeline companies an easement through their property.176 As a

172. See 389 U.S. 258, 258 (1967).
173. See, e.g., Duncan Adams, Mountain Valley Sues Landowners to Gain Pipeline
Easements and Access through Eminent Domain, ROANOKE TIMES (Oct. 27, 2017),
https://www.roanoke.com/business/news/mountain-valley-sues-landowners-to-gainpipeline-easements-and-access/article_abff5d87-1aee-5a50-b3c2-b3ee0c812e44.html
[https://perma.cc/44LE-N438] (quoting University of Virginia law professor Maureen
Brady’s observation that “filing suit against multiple landowners and properties at once is
standard procedure” for pipeline projects, such as the Mountain Valley Pipeline LLC,
which “filed a federal lawsuit against hundreds of landowners in Virginia”).
174. Robel, 389 U.S. at 263–64 (“For almost two centuries, our country has taken singular
pride in the democratic ideals enshrined in its Constitution, and the most cherished of
those ideals have found expression in the First Amendment. It would indeed be ironic if, in
the name of national defense, we would sanction the subversion of one of those liberties—
the freedom of association—which makes the defense of the Nation worthwhile.”).
175. Blake Nicholson, Pipeline Companies Say Activist ‘Valve Turners’ a Public Danger,
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Mar. 9, 2019), https://www.detroitnews.com /story/news/local
/Michigan/2019/03/09/valve-turners-enbridge/39172951 [https://perma.cc/6LJNF7UF] (noting that federal regulators issued a warning that “tampering with pipeline
valves can result in ‘death, injury, and economic and environmental harm,’” although
none of these direct actions have “led to an injury or spill”).
176. See, e.g., Adams, supra note 175 (describing a lawsuit brought by a pipeline
company to condemn private property to obtain easements because the company “has
been unable to negotiate mutually agreeable easement agreements with landowners”
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result, companies often acquire tracts of land along a pipeline route using
eminent domain, a process that can be set in motion even before a project
has received all necessary permissions.177 As a result, some courts have
granted rights of way through both public and private land to pipeline
projects still facing legal challenges from landowners.178 Under critical
infrastructure trespass laws, such land and any adjacent sites being used
to house construction materials would immediately become off-limits for
First Amendment activities, even by the landowners themselves. The
Court’s focus on the specific character and use of property in Marsh and
even in Lloyd is highly relevant in the gray area created by the Louisiana
statute’s “any site” language, due to the unique position pipeline
easements occupy on the public-private property spectrum.
The confusion surrounding the arrests of protesters near the Bayou
Bridge pipeline highlights the complexity of property rights where
pipeline easements are involved. One set of protesters asserted that they
had the express permission of the original property owners to be
present.179 Other protesters alleged that the pipeline project’s private
security confronted them on a public waterway—public lands being a
common feature near fossil fuel infrastructure development.180 Yet,
critical infrastructure statutes make no clear distinction as to when their
application begins; in fact, most seem to deliberately expand their reach
beyond the narrow boundaries of an easement, such as Louisiana’s decision
to include any construction equipment or “any site” where construction is
due in part to the fact that “[m]any property owners opposed to the pipeline have
refused to even enter such negotiations”); Dave Fehling, Pipeline Companies Fight for
Right to Take Property, NPR: STATEIMPACT (Feb. 13, 2012) https://stateimpact.npr.org/
texas/2012/02/13/pipeline-companies-fight-for-right-to-take-property
[https://perma.cc/5QAQ-MKZJ] (describing a Texas landowner and farmer’s refusal
to allow a pipeline survey crew onto their property).
177. Andrew Wimer & Institute for Justice, The Supreme Court Should End Pipeline
Companies’ “Build First, Pay Later” Use of Eminent Domain, FORBES (May 13, 2019),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/instituteforjustice/2019/05/13/the-supreme-courtshould-end-pipeline-companies-build-first-pay-later-use-of-eminentdomain/#74534e806cc9 [https://perma.cc/43UU-J2MV].
178. Order, In Re PennEast Pipeline, LLC., Civ. A. No.:18-1585 (D.N.J. Dec. 14,
2018); Jon Hurdle, PennEast Pipeline Can Take New Jersey Lands Using Eminent Domain,
Judge Rules, NPR (Dec. 14, 2018), https://stateimpact.npr.org/pennsylvania/2018/
12/14/penneast-pipeline-can-take-new-jersey-lands-using-eminent-domain-judgerules [https://perma.cc/SD4E-BVD6].
179. Haughey, supra note 60.
180. Id.; see also LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 450 (1979) (categorizing various types of
bodies of water, namely “running waters,” “navigable water bodies,” “the sea,” and “the
seashore,” as public places owned by the state).
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occurring, in addition to any “property containing” critical infrastructure.
The gray property lines and resulting vagueness of the boundaries of
permission and access under these circumstances differentiate critical
infrastructure trespass laws from conventional trespass laws.
2. “Co-conspirator” penalties under critical infrastructure laws implicate a
substantial amount of protected activity
Similarly, Oklahoma’s “any organization” language in its conspirator
provision casts the net far too wide and implicates legitimate organizing
and advocacy activities. By indiscriminately imposing liability on
organizations that might be affiliated in any way with individuals
charged under these statutes, critical infrastructure trespass bills
threaten activities ranging from providing food and water to
demonstrators to encouraging, and even organizing, lawful protests
against pipelines. This is exactly the sort of “substantial” infringement
the Court says it looks for in overbreadth cases.181
The “conspirator” provisions of critical infrastructure trespass laws
thus constitute an impermissible restriction on the speech of advocacy
organizations that engage in protests against fossil fuel infrastructure
as well as a massive burden on those organizations’ members’ rights of
free association. Claiborne Hardware directly addresses the arguments
made by certain bills’ sponsors, that these bills are only meant to prevent
“violent” protests, not peaceful ones: in the Court’s words, an “effort to
change the social, political, and economic structure of a local
environment cannot be characterized as a violent conspiracy simply by
reference to the ephemeral consequences of relatively few violent
acts.”182 Yet, the “any organization” conspirator provisions of critical
infrastructure trespass laws cast exactly the kind of broad net prohibited
by Claiborne.183 An organization faces potentially devastating liability if
even one individual involved with an otherwise peaceful, lawful protest
steps across the wrong property line—property lines that, as discussed
above, these statutes have deliberately rendered vague and overbroad.
Convicting an advocacy organization for conspiracy under these statutes
would require a holding that directly conflicts with Claiborne.

181. See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973).
182. 458 U.S. 886, 933 (1982).
183. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1792 (2017). (“If an organization is found to be a
conspirator with persons who are found to have committed any of the crimes described
[in this section], the conspiring organization shall be punished by a fine that is ten
times the amount of said fine . . . .”).
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Advocacy organizations’ work—in organizing and otherwise facilitating
lawful protests and in training individuals to responsibly conduct
nonviolent, direct civil action—merits protection under the First
Amendment. As the Court noted in Button, “‘[f]ree trade in ideas’ means
free trade in the opportunity to persuade to action, not merely to describe
facts.”184 The Court emphasized that the NAACP and its members “were
advocating lawful means of vindicating legal rights,” which is certainly true
for organizations orchestrating peaceful protests of pipelines and pipeline
construction sites.185 States should not criminalize these activities simply
because a demonstrator crosses an unclear line in the sand. But even
organizations training activists in direct action techniques as a mode of
political expression are not inherently undeserving of protection
simply because some individuals intend to break a particular law. The
training that many grassroots organizations provide for those activists
who choose to engage in civil disobedience is critical to ensuring those
activists’ safety as well as the safety of others, such as work crews, law
enforcement, and other bystanders.186
3. The overbroad scope of critical infrastructure trespass laws allows for an
excessive amount of law enforcement discretion
The breadth of properties implicated by critical infrastructure trespass
laws gives law enforcement vast discretion regarding where and when to
enforce such laws, thus enabling discriminatory enforcement. This
discretion is particularly disconcerting in light of the relationship between
pipeline companies, private security forces, and law enforcement.187
These troubling relationships came under fierce scrutiny during the
protests at Standing Rock, where private intelligence and security firms
hired by the construction company reportedly aided law enforcement
184. 371 U.S. 415, 437 (1963) (quoting Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 537
(1945)).
185. Id.
186. Nadine Bloch, Education and Training in Nonviolent Resistance, U.S. INST. OF PEACE
SPECIAL REPORT 394 (2016), https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR394-Educationand-Training-in-Nonviolent-Resistance.pdf [https://perma.cc/6WH3-Y8B4].
187. Karen Savage, Sherriff’s Deputies Protect Corporate Interests in Bayou Bridge Case,
TRUTHOUT (Dec. 12, 2018), https://truthout.org/articles/sheriffs-deputies-protectcorporate-interests-in-bayou-bridge-case [https://perma.cc/3C49-5E8V] (quoting
University of South Carolina law professor Seth Stoughton saying “[a]s public officials,
officers have an obligation to ensure they are honoring and indeed protecting
protesters’ First Amendment rights. The interest in respecting and protecting First
Amendment rights can come into sharp conflict with the private employers’ interests
in not having protesters in or near or around their work sites”).
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by collecting information on protesters and monitoring the protesters’
activities.188 In Louisiana, according to local reporting, the St. Martin
Parish Sheriff’s Office has allowed nearly five dozen deputies to
moonlight for a company contracted by Energy Transfer Partners to
provide security for the Bayou Bridge pipeline.189 As a result, thirteen
of the sixteen arrests under the state’s critical infrastructure law in
2018 were made by local sheriff’s deputies approved to work for the
pipeline project, and it remains unknown “whether the deputies . . .
were working their regular shifts or were moonlighting at the time” of
the arrests.190 In Minnesota, where a critical infrastructure trespass bill
successfully made its way through the legislature before being tabled—
at least temporarily—by the Governor, law enforcement has allegedly
been cooperating with private security firms “keeping tabs” on
protesters organizing to oppose the controversial Enbridge Line 3
pipeline.191 In his opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part in
Hill, Justice Powell noted that Houston had “made no effort to curtail the
wide discretion of police officers under the present ordinance.”192 In these
states, far from curtailing the discretion of police officers, legislatures are
turning a blind eye to the fact that members of law enforcement may have
an active incentive to exercise their discretion in an impermissible way,
by specifically targeting individuals protesting pipeline projects.
B. Courts Should Analyze Critical Infrastructure Trespass Laws as ContentBased Restrictions Motivated by an Impermissible Desire to Suppress
Certain Types of Protest
Courts can only see critical infrastructure laws as content-neutral if
they deliberately ignore the context in which these laws appeared as well
as the express intent of the laws’ authors and supporters. Legislators’

188. Will Parrish & Alleen Brown, How Police, Private Security, and Energy Companies
Are Preparing for a New Pipeline Standoff, INTERCEPT (Jan. 30, 2019),
https://theintercept.com/2019/01/30/enbridge-line-3-pipeline-minnesota
[https://perma.cc/XHV6-JNKW] (“In a time of growing resistance to fossil fuel
industries, the public-private partnership served as a chilling example of law
enforcement agencies acting as bulwarks of the oil industry.”).
189. See Savage, supra note 187 (noting that “moonlight[ing]” is the phenomenon
of officers working side jobs, in this instance, for private security firms).
190. Id. (noting that “[d]eputies wear full uniforms and use parish-issued weapons
and gear whether on duty as public servants for the parish or clocking in as part of
Energy Transfer Partners’ private security force”).
191. See Parrish & Brown, supra note 190.
192. 482 U.S. 451, 480 (1987) (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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comments regarding the intended purpose of critical infrastructure
trespass bills should open the door to content-based challenges to these
statutes. As Alan Chen writes, “constitutional analysis must account for the
possibility that lawmakers may draft laws in broad terms precisely to obscure
an illicit discriminatory legislative purpose.”193 In states such as Louisiana
and Oklahoma, where legislators are on the record discussing their desire
to restrict certain types of protest, the Court’s decision in Wallace illustrates
how such comments can pierce the veil of legislative intent that often
shrouds facially neutral laws from First Amendment content-based scrutiny.
The Court in Wallace examined two factors: the express declarations of a
bill’s author, and the demonstration of impermissible intent through an
otherwise unnecessary expansion of existing law.194
For critical infrastructure laws, the bills’ authors and proponents have
not been shy.195 The Court’s approach in both Wallace and Broadrick
supports the consideration of statements made by those in authoritative
positions to interpret a law’s scope when determining whether or not it
implicates protected First Amendment rights.196 While the laws
themselves might not expressly state that they are meant to target
protesters, let alone anti-pipeline protesters specifically, courts “cannot be
expected to ignore . . . authoritative pronouncements” in determining the
breadth and purpose of these bills.197
In addition to express declarations of intent, a number of states, like
Alabama in Wallace, had a pre-existing critical infrastructure trespass
statute that encompassed more traditional critical infrastructure sites
such as electrical transmission substations and water treatment
facilities.198 Louisiana’s newest law explicitly expanded its existing statute
to include pipelines and pipeline construction sites.199 While Oklahoma
did not have a pre-existing critical infrastructure statute, it has both
conspiracy and trespass laws already on the books, like every other state
that has or is currently considering critical infrastructure trespass bills.200

193. Chen, supra note 128, at 34.
194. 472 U.S. 38, 49–61 (1985).
195. See Brown & Parrish, supra note 53; see also Eastes, supra note 48.
196. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613, 617 (1973).
197. Id.
198. See 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
199. H.B. 727, 2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (La. 2018) (“An Act . . . to amend the definition
of ‘critical infrastructure’; to provide for a definition of ‘pipeline.’”).
200. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 716.11-12 (West 2018) (defining critical
infrastructure and critical infrastructure sabotage and determining that a “person who
commits critical infrastructure sabotage . . . is guilty of a class ‘B’ felony,” which results
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Coupling this factor with bill sponsors’ on-the-record statements
concerning the motivating purpose of critical infrastructure trespass bills,
as the Court did in Wallace, establishes a compelling case that the intent
behind these laws is to establish an impermissible, viewpoint-based
restriction on anti-pipeline protests.
CONCLUSION
Critical infrastructure trespass laws go far beyond regulating
“ordinary” criminal conduct, though these laws try hard to masquerade
as simple trespass laws.201 The fact that the states proposing and passing
these statutes already have trespass laws on the books, along with the
statutes’ draconian penalties in comparison to existing trespass laws,
underscore that these laws are a far cry from the ordinary trespass
statutes, breach-of-the-peace laws, and anti-noise ordinances dealt with
in similar cases where the Court has been reluctant to use First
Amendment doctrines to overturn facially neutral laws.202 The fact that
these statutes focus on conduct, rather than speech, should not blind
courts to the openly articulated and constitutionally impermissible
motivation behind these laws. If courts look away, they will only further
illustrate the extent to which First Amendment jurisprudence in recent
decades has left the promise of that Amendment ringing hollow.
The history of this country has been shaped by political expression
involving both speech and conduct. Civil disobedience in particular has
been vital to American political expression since colonists’ first
declarations of resistance to British rule. Since then, from the labor
movement203 to the Civil Rights movement to the anti-Vietnam War

in a fine ranging from eighty-five thousand to one hundred thousand dollars); S.B. 33,
133d Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2019) (proposing broader definitions of
“criminal trespass” and “aggravated trespass,” which would impose stricter penalties
for protests near pipelines); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1835 (West 2019) (imposing
criminal liability on anyone who “willfully or maliciously enter[s] the garden, yard,
pasture or field of another,” or “willfully enter[s] the pecan grove of another without
the prior consent of the owner”); S.B. 652, 2017 Gen. Assemb. (Pa. 2018) (classifying
critical infrastructure facility trespass as a type of felony criminal trespass).
201. See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613, 616 (1973) (noting that the law
under review, unlike “ordinary criminal laws,” targeted “political expression”).
202. See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 106–08, 121 (1972); Cantwell v.
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 300–03 (1940).
203. HANNAH ARENDT, CRISES OF THE REPUBLIC: LYING IN POLITICS; CIVIL
DISOBEDIENCE; ON VIOLENCE; THOUGHTS ON POLITICS AND REVOLUTION 80 (1969) (“The
whole body of labor legislation—the right to collective bargaining, the right to
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movement to the gay rights movement, every major political movement
in this country to date has relied upon acts of civil disobedience to convey
its message to those in power. Throughout these movements, protestors
have submitted themselves to fines, arrest, and even jail time for the
variety of misdemeanor charges historically associated with such conduct.
Of course, as long as Americans have practiced nonviolent
disobedience, there have been those who have rejected it as a viable
means of political expression. When Martin Luther King, Jr. wrote his
famous Letter from Birmingham Jail, he was replying to a letter from eight
Alabama clergymen criticizing the “unwise and untimely” use of
nonviolent civil disobedience by Civil Rights activists, calling upon them
to instead seek change through the “proper channels.”204 As discussed
throughout this Comment, courts have adopted a similarly hostile
attitude towards First Amendment claims involving acts of civil
disobedience. Hannah Arendt observed this trend in the 1960s, writing:
“the First Amendment neither in language nor in spirit covers the right
of association as it is actually practiced in this country—this precious
privilege whose exercise has in fact been (as Tocqueville noted)
‘incorporated with the manners and customs of the people’ for
centuries.”205 Instead, First Amendment jurisprudence has created too
many opportunities for abuse by legislatures creative enough to mask
their motives. In his dissenting opinion in Adderley, Justice Douglas
wrote: “Today a trespass law is used to penalize people for exercising a
constitutional right. Tomorrow a disorderly conduct statute, a breachof-the-peace statute, a vagrancy statute will be put to the same end.”206
These critical infrastructure trespass statutes are imposters—and clever
ones. As demonstrated repeatedly by the sponsors of critical infrastructure
trespass bills in multiple states, these laws are motivated by an express
desire to target pipeline protests and to penalize those who do engage in
organize and to strike—was preceded by decades of frequently violent disobedience of
what ultimately proved to be obsolete laws.”).
204. Letter to Martin Luther King, Jr.: A Group of Clergymen, TEACHING AMERICAN
HISTORY (Apr. 12, 1963), https://teachingamericanhistory.org/library/ document/
letter-to-martin-luther-king [https://perma.cc/AYU6-LRJB]; see also Lily Rothman,
Why
MLK
Was
Jailed
in
Birmingham,
TIME
(Apr.
16,
2015),
https://time.com/3773914/mlk-birmingham-jail [https://perma.cc/65NA-LLGX].
205. Arendt, supra note 226, at 203.
206. 385 U.S. 39, 56 (1966) (Douglas, J., dissenting). As Douglas further noted, “It
is said that the sheriff did not make the arrests because of the views which petitioners
espoused. That excuse is usually given, as we know from the many cases involving
arrests of minority groups for breaches of the peace, unlawful assemblies, and parading
without a permit.” Id.
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such protests while discouraging—via the threat of draconian penalties—
those who might otherwise be willing to risk not just engaging in direct
action and trespass, but even those who might simply participate in
lawful protests in the vicinity of pipelines or attend organizing efforts
where such protests might be discussed. Such impermissible intent
should not be shielded from scrutiny simply because critical infrastructure
bills look more like traditional trespass laws that the Court has been
reluctant to examine on Frist Amendment grounds.
Perhaps most importantly, if courts hold that critical infrastructure
trespass laws are unconstitutional, states will not be left without the laws
they need to regulate the “ordinary criminal conduct” of trespass.
Protestors who choose to deliberately trespass directly on the land where
pipelines are being constructed will face the same penalties activists have
faced for acts of civil disobedience throughout this country’s history.
Striking down critical infrastructure laws will leave states’ traditional
trespass laws in full effect. Laws against criminal assault that protect
construction crews and law enforcement would similarly remain in
force, as would laws against damaging private property. In other words,
as in Wallace and Hill, all of legislators’ alleged concerns in passing
these laws would still be addressed by existing law without jeopardizing
First Amendment interests.
The first legal challenge to Louisiana’s new critical infrastructure
trespass law was filed on May 22, 2019, by individuals arrested protesting
the Bayou Bridge pipeline and their community supporters.207 It will no
doubt be the first of many filed across the country. Whether or not
courts recognize these statutes for what they are will have profound
consequences for the future of American protest.

207. White Hat v. Landry, CTR. FOR CONST. RIGHTS, https://ccrjustice.org/home/what-wedo/our-cases/white-hat-v-landry [https://perma.cc/69SP-J7H5] (last modified Oct. 11, 2019).

